

The Uninhabited North.

While engaged in the hunt for the north pole and the exploration of Africa it is generally overlooked that no body has yet traversed Australia from east to west. At the London Geographical Congress Mr. Logan Tophy presented an interesting paper showing what portions of the earth remained unexplored, and according to him the extent of these is 25,000,000 square miles; 5,000,000 square miles in Asia, 2,000,000 in Australia, 2,000,000 in America, 2,000,000 in Asia and 6,000,000 in the Pacific are absolutely unknown. Besides in the arctic regions there are 3,500,000 and in the antarctic regions 5,900,000 square miles that are unexplored, but which, being uninhabitable, are of scientific rather than of practical interest. Philadelphia Inquirer.

Kipling's View of It.

"The Englishman," said Mr. Kipling, "will die for liberty, but he doesn't care a straw for equality. The Frenchman, on the other hand, doesn't really know what liberty means, but he must have equality. As for the American, he is both indifferent to liberty and equality, and goes in heart and soul for fraternity. This is really the basis of the American nation; so long as a man is a 'good fellow' he can do anything and people will approve, or, at least, will tolerate."

A Golden Beginning.

Gilboly—This is a little peculiar. Hostetter McGinnis—What is peculiar? "Young Freshy has really married that rich old widow he has been courting."

"What is there so funny about that?" "Nothing, except that he begins with his golden wedding."—Texas Sifter.

PERKINS has resigned from the Improved Order of Red Men?

"Yes, he is getting up an organization called the Improved Order of White Men."—Chicago Record.

Travel with a Friend

Who will protect you from those enemies—indigestion, malaria and the sickness produced by riding on the waves, and some time by inland traveling over the rough roads of the railroad? Such a friend is Hostetter's Stomachic. It is a potent, pleasant, and effective remedy for all ailments of the digestive system, which acquire as the traveler, the nervous and the nervous.

Don't forget that the summer hotel veranda is the happy hunting ground of the most

of these gossips on earth.

They'll be worth Double the money of any other. They will give you the best of health, and you will find them the best of friends. They will give you the best of health, and you will find them the best of friends.

CHAS. A. CARROLL, Druggist, N. Y.

1 box by mail for \$2. In bulk, \$1.50. J. T. SUTHERLAND, Savannah, Ga.

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Sackcloth and Ashes for the Negro.

wherein they reside; and the states are forbidden from making or enforcing any law which shall deprive the privilege of interstate commerce to citizens of the United States, or shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

The Brutal Decision of the United States Supreme Court.

The proper construction of this amendment was first called to the attention of this court in the *Slough-House* cases, (16 Wall. 86,) which involved, however, not a question of race, but one of exclusive privileges. The case did not call for any expression of opinion as to the exact rights it was intended to secure to the colored race, but it was said generally that its main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the Negro; to give definitions of citizenship of the United States and of the states, and to protect from the hostile legislation of the states the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the states.

THE MOST INFAMOUS PIECE OF JUDICIAL JUGGLERY KNOWN SINCE TIME BEGAN.

The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish the distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon the terms of social equality.

A DECISION UNKNOWN IN HELL ITSELF.

in places where they are liable to be brought into contact with the white race, and to enforce the equality of the two races upon the terms of social equality.

The Barbarous Ages Revived and Surpassed—Black Nurses and Dogs Can Ride in First-Class Cars, But Colored Gentlemen and Ladies Ruled Out by a Band of Tyrants.

One of the earliest of these cases is that of *Robert v. City of Boston*, (15 Cush. 184,) in which the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in the general school committee of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction of colored children in separate schools established exclusively for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the same.

Fool Judges Distort and Debauch the United States Constitution to Further Degrade the Race That Has Been Loyal to the Nation in Every Struggle for Its Existence.

the information now placed before the public is his particular race or color. The petition for the writ of prohibition averred that petitioner was an African American and one-eighth African blood; that the mixture of colored blood in his veins entitled him to every right, privilege and immunity secured to citizens of the United States of the white race; and that upon such theory, he took possession of a vacant seat in a coach where passengers of the white race were accommodated, and was ordered by the conductor to vacate said coach and take a seat in another assigned to persons of the colored race, and having refused to comply with such demand, he was forcibly ejected with the aid of a police officer, and imprisoned in the parish jail to answer a charge of having violated the above act.

Judge Taney's Decision is But a Bagatelle, Compared to This Latter Day Fulmination—Justice Harlan the Only Righteous Judge in the Corrupt Conclave—An Angel Among Demons—Let Us Teach Our Children to Reverence His Name and Keep It in Everlasting Remembrance.

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Supreme Court of the United States.

No. 210.—OCTOBER TERM, 1895. Homer Adolph Plessy, Plaintiff in Error vs. John H. Ferguson, Defendant. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. [May 18, 1896.]

This was a petition for writs of prohibition and certiorari, originally filed in the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana, the plaintiff in error, against the Hon. John H. Ferguson, judge of the criminal district court for the parish of Orleans, and setting forth in substance the following facts:

The case coming on for a hearing before the Supreme Court, that court was of opinion that the law under which the prosecution was had was constitutional, and denied the relief prayed for by the petitioner. (Ex parte Plessy, 44 La. Ann. 80.) Whereupon petitioner prayed for writ of error from this court, which was allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case turns upon the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the state of Louisiana, passed in 1890, providing for separate railway cars for the white and colored races. (Acts 1890, No. 111, p. 152.)

The first section of the statute enacts "that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this state, shall provide cars for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or dividing the passenger coaches by a partition so as to secure separate accommodations: Provided, that this section shall not be construed to apply to street railways. No person or persons shall be permitted to occupy seats in coaches, other than the ones assigned to them, on account of the color of their bodies."

By the second section it was enacted "that the officers of such passenger trains shall have power and are hereby required to assign each passenger to the coach or compartment used for the race to which such passenger belongs; any passenger refusing to go into a coach or compartment to which by race he does not belong, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than ten days in the parish prison, and any officer of any railroad insisting on assigning a passenger to a coach or compartment other than the one set aside for the race to which said passenger belongs, shall be liable to a fine of twenty-five dollars, or in lieu thereof to imprisonment for a period of not more than ten days in the parish prison; and should any passenger refuse to occupy the coach or compartment to which he or she is assigned by the officer of such railway, said officer shall have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his train, and for such refusal neither he nor the railway company which he represents shall be liable for damages in any of the courts of this state."

The third section provides penalties for the refusal or neglect of the officers, directors, conductors and employees of railway companies to comply with the act, with a proviso that "nothing in this act shall be construed as applying to nurses attending children of the other race." The fourth section is immaterial.

The information filed in the criminal district court charged in substance that Plessy, being a passenger between two stations within the state of Louisiana, was assigned by officers of the company to the coach used for the race to which he belonged, but he insisted upon going into a coach used by the race to which he did not belong. Neither is

made applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude, was unconstitutional and void, upon the ground that the fourteenth amendment was prohibitory upon the states only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by congress for enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters respecting which the states were prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was corrective legislation, such as might be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts.

In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Bradley observed that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not invest congress with the power to legislate upon subjects that are within the domain of state legislation; but to provide modes of relief against state legislation, or state action of the kind referred to."

It does not authorize congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of state laws, and the action of state officers upon the states only, and when these are subversive of the fundamental rights secured in the amendment.

Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are secured by way of prohibition against state laws and state proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed state laws or state proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect."

More recent, and, indeed, almost direct in point of the case of *Loisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mississippi*, (133 U. S. 587,) wherein the railway company was indicted for a violation of a statute of Mississippi, enacting that all railroads carrying passengers should provide equal and commodious accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger-cars by a partition, so as to secure separate accommodations. The case was presented in a different aspect from the one under consideration, inasmuch as it was an indictment against the railway company for failing to provide the separate accommodations, but the question considered was the constitutionality of the law. In that case the supreme court of Mississippi (69 Miss. 520) had held that the statute applied solely to commerce within the state, and that, being the construction of the state statute by its highest court, was accepted as conclusive. "If it be a matter," said the court, p. 531, "respecting commerce wholly within the state, and not interfering with commerce between the states, then, obviously, there is no violation of the commerce clause of the federal constitution."

No question arises under the present case, as to the power of the state to separate its citizens into different compartments for interstate commerce, or affect, in any manner, the privileges and rights of such passengers. All that we can consider is, whether the state has the power to require that railroads carrying passengers should provide separate accommodations for the two races; that affecting only commerce within the state is no invasion of the power given to congress by the commerce clause."

A like course of reasoning applies to the case under consideration, since the supreme court of Louisiana in the case of *State ex. rel. Abbott v. Judge*, (44 La. Ann. 770,) held that the statute in question did not apply to interstate commerce, but to commerce within the state, and that the application to passengers traveling exclusively within the borders of the state. The case was decided largely upon the authority of *Railroad Co. v. State*, (66 Miss. 692,) and affirmed, 133 U. S. 587.

The present case no question of interference with interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both its terminus and its route within the state. Similar statutes for the separation of the two races upon public conveyances were held to be constitutional in *West Chester Co. R. R. v. Miles*, (55 Penn. 320); *Day v. Owen*, (5 Mich. 529); *Chicago & North Western R. Co. v. Williams*, (15 Ill. 185); *Chesapeake & R. R. Co. v. Wells*, (85 Tenn. 613); *Memphis & R. R. Co. v. Benson*, (85 Tenn. 627); *The State*, (22 Fed. R. 343); *Logwood v. Railroad Co.* (23 Fed. R. 318); *Railroad Co. v. Jones*, (37 Fed. R. 639); *People v. Kinney*, (18 N. E. Rep. 245); *Honick v. South-Pac. R. Co.*, (38 Fed. Rep. 226); *Heard v. Railroad Co.* (4 Int. Com. Com'n. 111); *S. C. (1) 428.*

While we think the enforced separation of the races is applied to the internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are not prepared to say that the conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does not act at his peril, or that the provision of the section of the act, that denies to the passenger compensation in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which he properly belongs, is a valid exercise of the legislative power. Indeed, we understand it to be contended by the state's attorney, that such part of the act as exempts from liability the railway company and its officers is unconstitutional. The power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to refuse to assign to another coach, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular state, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored person. This question, though indicated in the brief of the plaintiff, is not raised in the record, and we do not deem it proper to properly arise upon the record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act, so far as it requires the railway to provide separate accommodations, and the conductor to assign passengers according to their race.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is so far as it applies to the colored race, a right of action, or of inheritance, or property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him, or in any way affects his right to such property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.

In this connection it is also suggested

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The present case no question of interference with interstate commerce can possibly arise, since the East Louisiana Railway appears to have been purely a local line, with both its terminus and its route within the state. Similar statutes for the separation of the two races upon public conveyances were held to be constitutional in *West Chester Co. R. R. v. Miles*, (55 Penn. 320); *Day v. Owen*, (5 Mich. 529); *Chicago & North Western R. Co. v. Williams*, (15 Ill. 185); *Chesapeake & R. R. Co. v. Wells*, (85 Tenn. 613); *Memphis & R. R. Co. v. Benson*, (85 Tenn. 627); *The State*, (22 Fed. R. 343); *Logwood v. Railroad Co.* (23 Fed. R. 318); *Railroad Co. v. Jones*, (37 Fed. R. 639); *People v. Kinney*, (18 N. E. Rep. 245); *Honick v. South-Pac. R. Co.*, (38 Fed. Rep. 226); *Heard v. Railroad Co.* (4 Int. Com. Com'n. 111); *S. C. (1) 428.*

While we think the enforced separation of the races is applied to the internal commerce of the state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, we are not prepared to say that the conductor, in assigning passengers to the coaches according to their race, does not act at his peril, or that the provision of the section of the act, that denies to the passenger compensation in damages for a refusal to receive him into the coach in which he properly belongs, is a valid exercise of the legislative power. Indeed, we understand it to be contended by the state's attorney, that such part of the act as exempts from liability the railway company and its officers is unconstitutional. The power to assign to a particular coach obviously implies the power to refuse to assign to another coach, as well as the power to determine who, under the laws of the particular state, is to be deemed a white, and who a colored person. This question, though indicated in the brief of the plaintiff, is not raised in the record, and we do not deem it proper to properly arise upon the record in this case, since the only issue made is as to the unconstitutionality of the act, so far as it requires the railway to provide separate accommodations, and the conductor to assign passengers according to their race.

It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that, in any mixed community, the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race, is so far as it applies to the colored race, a right of action, or of inheritance, or property. Conceding this to be so, for the purposes of this case, we are unable to see how this statute deprives him, or in any way affects his right to such property, since he is not lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.

In this connection it is also suggested

made applicable to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude, was unconstitutional and void, upon the ground that the fourteenth amendment was prohibitory upon the states only, and the legislation authorized to be adopted by congress for enforcing it was not direct legislation on matters respecting which the states were prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or doing certain acts, but was corrective legislation, such as might be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the effect of such laws or acts.

In delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Bradley observed that the Fourteenth Amendment "does not invest congress with the power to legislate upon subjects that are within the domain of state legislation; but to provide modes of relief against state legislation, or state action of the kind referred to."

Editorial—Will you give us space in your paper just to say a few words for our men and Sunday school? We are rolling about sixty-five members, and about twenty-five active scholars, something like the church of a first Sunday school in good order. We have a missionary connected with the Sunday school. It is doing a good work. We do on hand for missionary salaries up to \$25 or \$30 by the conference, which will mean Port, Ark.

I sat to the general conference and council with the brain of this church. I was inspired with a zeal than ever I was before or for the church more in every detail. I have been in the past the church for 19 years and met every conference, and by so I have some knowledge of its needs and wants of the church, yet I am almost very little about to learn everything I know of it. I have kept my mouth shut now, not because I did not see how to say, but we were not slow to say. Now, let many men come forward to wake up and do more than ever before. The force of missions is its nature, it continues under the management of Bishop Turner, will become of God against all wrongdoings often say, "reading it," what he has said of things, and what Bishop Turners that had led us against every conceivable means thing done against the church. What change would be in the church or turner's is the force of missions paper that has the right to speak for the Negro's majority country, and yet, while he as he does, he can go anywhere United States and be respected as a citizen of people. Why is it because God is with him and would be with more of us would show our manhood! Let us get up and out and take against everything that is against us. Speak; if we do we will leave behind us the one that we died for the right, and the world will see that we died for the blessing Bishop Turner, and the blessed Baptist. The rights of all citizens of people. If I was able I would place the force of missions in the hands of Negro reader in the United States. Hold up your hands and cry out right. God will come to help who are true trust in him. A word about Jonathan, Ark. Negroes are not allowed to go into the town to get work and to do. Only two schools in the county. I am doing all I can to save to leave this county and go where they can get work, and them this, "the man that is getting, and don't want anything, he to stay where he can't get anything, but the man that wants to better himself, he ought to go where he can get work and something to eat." I would not stay in own 24 hours if I could get away honorable discharge from my military service. Eschore, Ark.

TO THE VOICE OF MISSIONS.

The Woman's Home and Foreign Missionary Societies of the Fourth Episcopal District, Michigan Conference.

SIXTEEN—I now appeal to you through the columns of our beloved VOICE OF MISSIONS. Our fourth annual conference convenes in Ann Arbor, Mich., Wednesday, August 26, at 10 o'clock. Our action plan is most masterly reported. Let us be up and ready and see if our report of Annapolis has exceeded that of May. We have had a long quarter to work, to our convention meeting on Saturday night. Let us come prepared to sing in glorious report, stronger numbers and larger in finance. You have been idle dreaming, and for the battle prepare. Let society send in a full report to corresponding secretary, and to state treasurer, by August 15, 1896.

If any little word of mine
May make a life the lighter;
If any little song of mine
May make a heart the lighter,
I take me back the little word
And keep my bit of singing,
And drop it in some lonely place
And set the echoes ringing."

ETHELLE M. ALEXANDER, Cor. Sec.
643 Antoine St., Detroit, Mich.
Aug. 15, 1896.

The Wrecks a Church in Oklahoma.

PERRY, OKLAHOMA, June 29.

VOICE OF MISSIONS:

"Please allow me space to send an letter to my many friends and sisters, no doubt you will like to hear from us. In the city of Muskogee, Okla., a building 33 feet, and on the 23rd of May caught two holes upon which to set building for the worship of God. On 15th of June, '96, we succeeded in setting the building on completion of the construction of the building was visited by a cyclone. Our building, which cost us \$100, was blown from the trucks and the west broke half in two. We will replace the building and it will make us a nice church when completed, three windows on each side, a bay window in the end and a belfry in front. The board of education has permission to hold meetings in old high school building, corner of 1st and 2nd streets, until we can get the new church erected. We are now in need of all the help that we can get to aid us in erecting the new church. Mr. E. C. Church, corner H. and M. streets.

An obedient servant, brother in Christ and for his church,

E. C. CONNORS.

DRUNKENNESS CURED.

Drunkenness is a disease; it can be cured in three days by Mrs. Clara's specific remedy without the druggist's knowledge. Hundreds of persons have pronounced it safe and sound. Send one dollar in stamps money for cure and directions.

DRESS MISS CLARE,
311 Penn St., Reading, Pa.

A Christian Recorder has greatly enjoyed of late, and inasmuch as General Conference every pastor in the United States to get ten subscribers if the number was reduced to 91, they will have the privilege should they fail upon the ground that the paper is not gratis. I shall expect to receive a great deal of support.